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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Randle argued that the district court erred when it
applied the feel free to leave inquiry instead of the feel free to ignore the officer's
request when it determined that Mr. Randle was not seized within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. Additionally, Mr. Randle argued that he was seized under the feel
free to leave inquiry and that his potential criminal liability for obstructing should have
been considered as a factor under both of the aforementioned tests.

In its

Respondent's Brief the State argued that the district court did not err when it denied
Mr. Randie's motion to suppress. In support of this contention, the State relied on an
unpublished opinion and on an analogy to the "knock and talk" doctrine.
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the precedential value of an
unpublished opinion and the State's assertion that "knock and talk" encounters do not
have to be supported by any reasonable suspicion.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Randie's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.

1

ISSUES

1

1.

Did the district court err when it applied the feel free to leave inquiry as opposed
to the feel free to ignore the officer's request inquiry in determining whether
Mr. Randle was seized within the meaning of the State and Federal
Constitutions?

2.

Did the district court err in its application of the feel free to leave inquiry when it
found that Mr. Randle was not seized within the meaning of the State and
Federal Constitutions?

3.

Should Mr. Randie's potential criminal liability for obstructing pursuant to
I.C. § 18-705 have been considered as a factor under both the feel free to leave
inquiry and the feel free to ignore the officer's request inquiry? 1

For purposes of t~1is Reply Brief, argument will only be presented on issue II.
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred In Its Application Of The Feel Free To Leave Inquiry When It
Found That Mr. Randle Was Not Seized Within The Meaning Of The State And Federal
Constitutions

A.

Introduction
The State relied on an unpublished opinion as precedent in contravention of the

Idaho Supreme Court Operating Rules.
Additionally, the State argued that a consensual encounter with police is
analogous with the 'knock and talk" doctrine and does not need to be supported by
reasonable suspicion.

However, the State's authority for this proposition requires that

the State have a governmental interest to investigate or reasonable suspicion.

B.

The District Court Erred In Its Application Of The Free Feel To Leave Inquiry
When It Found That Mr. Randle Was Not Seized Within The Meaning Of The
State And Federal Constitutions
In its Respondent's Brief the State relies on an unpublished opinion, State v.

James, Unpublished Opinion No 624 (September 2, 2010), to support of its position that

Mr. Randle was not seized when the officer knocked on his window.

However, the

unpublished opinion is not to be cited as authority and is, therefore, neither case law nor
binding precedent. (Respondent's Brief, p.9) (see also Supreme Court Operating Rules
Rule 15(f) "If an opinion is not published, it may not be cited as authority or precedent in
any court.") (emphasis added).
Additionally, the James opinion should be considered as a community caretaker
case, which is not applicable in this case because the district court expressly found that
that exception to the warrant equipment was not applicable under the facts of this case.
(05/03/10 Tr., p.14, Ls.11-14.) In James, a police officer had noticed a truck at a gas
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station with the engine running and the driver slumped forward. James at 1. Two and
one-half hours later, the same officer noticed the same vehicle and the driver were in
the same position. Id.
The officer parked behind the truck without turning on his overhead lights,
approached the driver's window, and asked James to roll down his
window. After James's [sic] failed attempts to roll down the window, the
officer opened the driver's side door and James stepped out of the truck.
The officer noticed that James smelled of alcohol, his eyes were red and
bloodshot, and his speech was slurred.

Id. at 1-2. James was arrested for DUI and challenged the arrest based on a theory that
the officer's actions constituted an illegal seizure.

Id. at 2.

In analyzing James'

argument, the Idaho Court of Appeals citied to In re Clayton, 113 Idaho 817 (1998). Id.
at 3-4. In Clayton, law enforcement noticed a person slumped over the steering wheel
of a running vehicle with the lights on early in the morning. Clayton, 113 Idaho at 81718. The officer approached the vehicle "to determine whether the person was in need
of medical attention, asleep or intoxicated."

Id. at 818.

Upon his approach of the

vehicle, the officer "opened the driver's side door, reached in, turned the motor off, and
took possession of the keys." Id.
illegal search.

Id.

Mr. Clayton challenged the officer's actions as an

The Idaho Supreme Court upheld the officer's actions under the

community caretaker function. Id. Specifically, the Court stated:
When [the officer] observed the vehicle with its motor running, lights on, and the
driver slumped forward, he had a duty as a police officer to investigate, as stated
in Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 443,442 (1973):
Because of the extensive regulation of motor vehicles and traffic, and also
because of the frequency with which a vehicle can become disabled or
involved in an accident on public highways, the extent of police-citizen
contact involving automobiles will be substantially greater than policecitizen contact in a home or office. Some such contacts will occur because
the officer may believe the operator has violated a criminal statute, but
many more will not be of that nature. Local police officers, unlike federal
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officers, frequently investigate vehicle accidents in which there is no claim
of criminal liability and engage in what, for want of a better term, may be
described as community caretaking functions, totally divorced from the
detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation
of a criminal statute.
Here, at 1:30 in the morning, the vehicle was in a parking lot with its lights on and
motor running, with the driver slumped forward. Tested upon practical
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable persons act, this situation
falls outside the boundaries of normal conduct. The driver could have been hurt
or sick, and in need of medical attention. Officer Moser acted prudently and
satisfied his caretaking function when investigating the vehicle.
Id. (emphasis added). The Clayton decision is a community caretaker case.

In James it is not entirely clear whether the opinion is a community caretaker
case or if it stands for a larger proposition. The State cites the following portion of the
James case:
We agree with the district court that the officer's actions did not amount to
a seizure. When the officer pulled into the parking lot, he parked well
behind James's [sic] truck and did not activate his overhead lights. James
was already parked when the officer arrived and he was under no
obligation to comply with the officer's request to roll down the window. He
was never given any order or direction to exit the vehicle; he did so on his
own accord. The actions of the officer did not amount to a seizure as the
officer made no show of force or authority over James that restricted his
freedom of movement.
(Respondent's Brief, p.9) (quoting James, at 5).

However, the full paragraph

begins with the following three sentences:
The district court determined that the officer's actions did not amount to a
stop or a detention. The district court denied James's [sic] motion to
suppress stating that the opening of the driver's door was 'a necessary
and prudent act of that officer's duties to protect the public. And that it
was a reasonable act of a community caretaking function that did not
violate James's [sic] Forth Amendment rights.' We will not disturb the
district court's findings of fact which are supported by substantial
evidence. We agree with the district court that the ....
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Id. Since the community caretaker doctrine is an exception to the warrant requirement
and its invocation must be based on the assumption that either a search or a seizure
occurred. State v. Cutler, 143 Idaho 297, 304 (Ct. App. 2006). ("One narrow exception
to the warrant requirement permits an officer to search a vehicle in furtherance of
community caretaking activities.") (see also State v. Maddox, 137 Idaho 821, 824-25
(Ct. App. 2002). ("One narrow exception to the warrant requirement permits an officer to
search a vehicle in furtherance of community caretaking activities.

Since the district

court applied the community caretaker exception to the warrant requirement, there must
have been either an illegal seizure or search. Therefore, the James opinion should be
considered as a community care taker case.
In its Respondent's Brief the State argues that the officer's knock on Mr. Randie's
window was a consensual encounter,
analogous to a 'knock and talk' police investigatory practice, which has
clearly been recognized as legitimate. See U.S. v. Gould, 364 F.3d 578,
590 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing U.S. v. Jones, 239 F.3d 716 720 (5th Cir.
2001)). An Officer need not first develop reasonable suspicion that
criminal activity is afoot before employing this strategy. Gould, 364 F.3d
at 590, Jones, 239 F.3d 720; see also Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429,
435 (1991).
(Respondent's Brief, pp. 10-11.)

The State's authority does not stand for this

proposition and is only applicable when law enforcement officers are carrying out an
official investigation.
In Gould, law enforcement had received "a telephone warning that Gould, known
to be a convicted felon with a reputation for violence, was planning to kill two local
judges."

Gould, 364 F.3d at 580.

Police officer went to the known residence of

Mr. Gould and entered the home with the consent of a roommate and preformed a
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protective sweep of the residence. Id. The focus of the Gould opinion was resolving the
issue of whether a protective sweep must accompany a search incident to a lawful
arrest. Id, at 381. While addressing an argument related to that inquiry the court noted:
We note that a 'knock and talk' police investigatory practice has clearly
been recognized as legitimate. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 239 F.3d
716, 720 (5th Cir.2001 ). Certainly, the officers were in the mobile home for
a legitimate governmental purpose, namely questioning Gould about the
information they had received earlier that day, in two telephone calls from
Gould's employee (or co-worker) Forehand, an individual otherwise
unknown to them, that Gould, known to be a person prone to violence,
was planning to kill two local judges. As the district court recognized, 'the
officers had a legitimate governmental interest in questioning the
defendant about the information they had received.'
Id. at 590 (emphasis added). The" knock and talk" practice is an investigatory practice.

Inherent in that statement is that law enforcement must be carrying out an investigation.
Tl"lis is distinguishable between a consensual government contact where a policy officer
is have a casual and consensual conversation with a citizen.

This interpretation is

supported by the fact that the 5th Circuit mentioned that law enforcement were carrying
out the policed investigation for a legitimate governmental purpose, i.e. a purported
death threat against two local judges. (empl1asis added.)
In U.S. v. Jones, 239 F.3d 716 (5th Cir. 2001), which is cited to in both the
Respondent's Brief and in Gould, law enforcement had received various complaints
about an apartment and the sale of illegal drugs.

Law enforcement decided to

investigate tl1ese complaints, and on their way to the apartment, were the alleged drug
sales were occurring, they had a conversation with a woman who claimed that she had
gone to the apartment to buy illegal drugs.

Jones, 239 at 718-19. When the officer

reached the exterior of the apartment they noticed a hand gun in plain view inside the
apartment. Id. at 719. Mr. Jones was arrested and in a motion to suppress he argued
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that the officer's entry into his apartment was unreasonable because the officer's
created the exigency used to justify their warrantless entry into the apartment.

Id. at

719-720. In ruling on this issue, the 5th Circuit reasoned as follows:
In assessing whether the officers created the exigency, we focus on the
"reasonableness of the officers' investigative tactics leading up to the
warrantless entry." Blount, 123 F.3d at 838.
Federal courts have recognized the "knock and talk" strategy as a
reasonable investigative tool when officers seek to gain an occupant's
consent to search or when officers reasonably suspect criminal activity.
See United States v. Tobin, 923 F.2d 1506, 1511 (11th Cir.) ("Reasonable
suspicion cannot justify the warrantless search of a house, but it can
justify the agents' approaching the house to question the occupants.'°)i
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 907, 112 S.Ct. 299, 116 L.Ed.2d 243 (1991); United
States v. Hardeman, 36 F.Supp.2d 770, 777 (E.D.Mich.1999) (discussing
the "knock and talk" procedure to obtain a suspects consent to search).
Officer Ruff testified that his purpose in approaching Apartment No. 3 was
to identify the occupants and discuss the complaints of drug activity. This
investigative tactic is not inherently unreasonable.

Id. at 720. According to the State's authority, the talk and knock rule applies in two
contexts, when officers seek consent to search or when officers reasonably suspect
criminal activity.

Contrary to the state's assertion that "[a]n Officer need not first

develop reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot before employing this [knock
and talk] strategy," it is apparent that reasonable suspicion is required under the latter of
the two contexts. (Respondent's Brief, p. 11.) The remaining question is what judicial
scrutiny is applied when officers are employing the "knock and talk" doctrine to obtain
consent to search.

State v. Johnson, 137 Idaho 656 (Ct. App. 2002), dealt with a routine traffic stop,
which eventually lead to an arrest. In upholding the arrest, the Idaho Court of Appeals
noted that a request for consent to search was a subcomponent of an investigation.

Johnson, 137 Idaho at 660. "This reasonable suspicion justified further investigation,

8

including the request for consent to search Johnson's automobile." Id.

Implicit in the

foregoing is that law enforcement must have reasonable suspicion to legally request
consent to search.
The "knock and talk" rule is not applicable in this matter because Mr. Randle was
not the subject of a police investigation when the officer knocked on his window. In fact,
and as pointed out in the Appellant's brief, the officer admitted that he had no legitimate
(Appellant's Brief, pp.1-2) (see also 05103/10

reason to speak with Mr. Randle.

Tr., p.14, Ls.11-14) ("I don't think that the State would be arguing the community
caretaker function in this case, because I don't know the articulated facts would support
that").
In sum, the State's reliance on an unpublished onion is misplaced because it
cannot stand for precedential authority. Further, the "knock and talk" rule is a tactic law
enforcement can employ when conducting an investigation which is supported by some
form of governmental interest such as reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is
afoot. Since there was no investigation and no reasonable suspicion in this case, the
"knock and talk" doctrine is not applicable.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Randle respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order
denying Mr. Randie's motion to suppress and remand this case to the district court for
further proceedings.
DATED this 19th day of September, 2011.

,,/---z_ 6

/

SHAWN F. WILKERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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